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these sellers can post quantity bonuses. We give a condition under which the quantity 
bonus can replicate the equilibrium that would have obtained if the seller could directly 
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1.   Introduction 
Haggling over prices is a very common practice in many African, Caribbean, Latin 
American, and Asian economies. Flea markets and farmers markets in developed 
economies also share this bargaining feature even if to a lesser extent. There is also a 
trading practice, allied to price bargaining, usually involving agricultural produce in 
developing economies. This is the practice of a seller giving extra units of the produce (to 
a buyer) for free after bargaining over the price with the buyer. The buyer does not pay 
for this extra quantity. The extra quantity is not subject to bargaining, otherwise the buyer 
will be seen as ungrateful. During price bargaining, the seller usually (explicitly) tells the 
buyer to accept a higher price in return for the free units. We do not know of any word in 
the English language for this practice. Hereafter, we shall use quantity bonus to describe 
this practice.
 This practice is also called “dum” in Korea, “jaara” in parts of Ghana and 
Nigeria and “mbasela” in Zambia. Informal interviews confirm that the practice is also 
prevalent in places like Mexico, Phillipines, and several developing economies. Indeed, 
this practice is as pervasive as price bargaining in markets for agricultural produce. We 
wish to explain why the seller gives the buyer free units of the good when it appears that 
a lower price would serve the same purpose. 
We model the quantity bonus as a fixed proportion of the quantity purchased. 
Thus quantity bonus is similar to promotional practices by firms in western economies 
where a consumer gets some units of a commodity for free for a given amount purchased; 
for example, “buy two, get one free”. What makes quantity bonus in developing 
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economies different is its interaction with price bargaining as opposed to the interaction 
of quantity bonus and posted prices in western economies. 
This practice implies some common pattern of social norms in exchange. It 
appears that the practice is partly generated by concerns of equity or fairness. The buyer 
walks away with the good believing that it was a fair bargain. For the most part we do not 
focus on this explanation. We argue that quantity bonus is a profit-maximizing strategy 
by sellers in a market where there is necessarily price bargaining. Quantity bonuses are 
used because they can be posted but prices cannot be posted. We explain why quantity 
bonuses can be posted. As noted above, the sellers in these markets usually persuade 
buyers (during price bargaining) to accept a higher price in return for a quantity bonus.  
We are not aware of any work that attempts to analyze the nature of such market 
behavior. We offer here a framework and shed some light on the practice of quantity 
bonus. The paper adds to the literature on price haggling (Arnold and Lippman, 1998; 
Bester, 1993, 1994; Riley and Zeckhauser 1983). It also adds to the literature on non-
price competition (Spence, 1977; White and  Boudreaux, 1998). Finally, we think we 
offer what could be considered as a theory of bargaining deals. 
  Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) argue that haggling, as opposed to fixed posted 
prices, is sub-optimal for a seller. This is because haggling makes it difficult for a seller 
to post a high price if buyers know that they can always haggle and buy the good at a 
lower price. Bester (1994) argues that if the buyer’s cost of switching sellers is relatively 
low, then most trade will be conducted via haggling.
1 Arnold and Lippman (1998) prove 
that sellers prefer  posted prices when buyers have a sufficiently high bargaining ability.  
                                                           
1 For related but different argument based on the costs of bargaining, see Wang (1995). 
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Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) also argue that posted prices may be used to prevent 
collusion between buyers and sales agents. We elaborate on this point by arguing that 
where there are no principal/agent problems, haggling should be more prevalent than 
posted prices. The reason is that there is no incentive for the seller to under-state the price 
at which the good was sold; the seller is the sole residual claimant of the profit from the 
transaction. Haggling is therefore more likely in small businesses and among market 
women in developing countries where there is no separation of ownership and control or 
where there are less likely to be agency problems. In contrast, in big businesses and 
super-markets where there are likely to be agency problems, the principal has the 
incentive to post prices rather than giving salesmen (i.e., agents) the discretion of 
negotiating the price with buyers. With posted prices, sales agents cannot under-state the 
price at which the good was sold. One may argue that the principal could instruct sales 
agents to bargain over the price subject to the condition that the good is not sold below 
some minimum price. However, there may be no point in doing so if bargaining is time-
consuming and if the principal is likely to end up with the minimum price anyway (given 
that the sales agents have the incentive to under-state the bargained price and report the 
minimum price).  
The perishability of agricultural products makes it difficult for market women in 
developing countries to commit to posted prices. We are not suggesting that prices cannot 
be posted for perishable goods. However, the shorter the time required for a seller to 
dispose of a good (before it loses its value), the more difficult it is to credibly commit to a 
posted price. Also, since there is a lot of variance in the quality of agricultural produce in 
developing economies, buyers are reluctant to accept posted prices because of quality 
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uncertainty.
2 Allowing buyers to bargain over prices makes them feel more comfortable 
about getting a price which matches their perceived quality of the commodity.  
In summary the following factors explain why price bargaining (not posted 
prices) exists in LDC agricultural markets:  (i) quality uncertainty due to heterogeneity of 
agricultural produce (ii) inability to commit to a posted price due to the perishability of 
agricultural products, and (iii) the absence of agency problems due to the prevalence of 
sole proprietorships in LDC agricultural markets. 
  Given price bargaining in LDC agricultural markets, we are interested in the 
following question: why do sellers offer quantity bonus, when it appears that price can 
replicate quantity bonus? As noted above, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) showed that price 
posting is more profitable than bargaining if the seller can post prices. They argue that the 
primary cost of allowing buyers to bargain is that “…it encourages buyers to refuse a 
high price in the hope of getting a lower one (p. 270).” To eradicate this cost, they show 
that sellers should post prices if they could. Our argument is that if sellers cannot post 
prices they will allow price bargaining but will also use non-price tools (like quantity 
bonus) that they can post to reduce (not necessarily eliminate) the cost identified by Riley 
and Zeckhauser (1983). Quantity bonus is an example of what we call a bargaining deal. 
A bargainer will offer such deals to increase his share of the surplus. 
In the next section, we offer a model that examines price bargaining and quantity 
bonus. We show that it is an equilibrium to have bargained prices and quantity bonus. In 
section 3, we argue that while it may appear that price can replicate quantity bonus, the 
                                                           
2 Indeed, markets with quality uncertainty or high variance in quality tend to have price haggling than 
markets with less quality variability. For example, the used-car market is subject to more price bargaining 
than the market for new cars. 
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inability of sellers to post prices explains why they use quantity bonus (a strategic tool 
which they can post). We explain why the sellers can post quantity bonuses. Concluding 
remarks follow in Section 4. 
 
 
2.  A basic model  
Consider a seller and a buyer who bargain over the price of a good.
3 Suppose the 
buyer wants to purchase q units of the good. Let the price be p. The seller has a marginal 
cost of c ≥ 0 for the good. The buyer’s demand function for the good is q = a – p, where  
a > c.  
  We model the practices of haggling (bargaining) over the price and quantity 
bonus as a four-stage game. In stage 0, the seller announces and commits to a quantity 
bonus. In stage 1, the buyer and the seller bargain over the price. In stage 2, the buyer 
announces the quantity he wants to buy, given the price. In stage 3, the buyer gets the 
quantity bonus. We assume this sequence of actions because it conforms to our 
understanding of what happens in the real world (i.e., LDC agricultural markets). One 
could argue that an efficient outcome will be attained if the buyer and seller bargain over 
price and quantity jointly. While this is an interesting theoretical possibility, we opt for 
the sequence of actions which conforms to reality because buyers and sellers do not 
bargain over quantity in these markets. 
We assume that for q units of the good purchased, the seller gives the buyer αq 
units of the good for free, where α ≥ 0. Hence the buyer spends a total of pq on the good 
                                                           
3It is important to note that our analysis does not hinge on the assumption of one buyer. As in Bester (1993, 
1994) if we assume that buyers do not interact strategically and are identical, then these assumptions 
together with constant returns to scale (i.e., constant marginal cost) imply that the equilibrium outcome is 
independent of the number of buyers. 
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but consumes (q + αq) units. So he effectively pays an (average) price of p/(1 + α). 
Given p and α, his “effective” demand for the good (i.e., taking into account the quantity 
bonus), is q  = q (p, α) = a – p/(1 + α). ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 4 For the sake of exposition, we refer to α as the 
quantity bonus. It is important to note that   is what he consumes (not what he pays for); 
he pays for q /(1 + α) units at a price of p and gets α /(1 + α) units for free. 
q ˆ
q ˆ
We assume complete information and our solution concept is sub-game 
perfection. We solve the game by backward induction. Hence, we begin the analysis from 
the last stage (i.e., stage 3). In this stage, the buyer gets his quantity bonus, α /(1 + α). 
In stage 2, the buyer announces the quantity of good he wants to buy, q /(1 + α).
q ˆ
ˆ 5 We use 
consumer’s surplus, CS, as his measure of welfare. Using  q  = a – p/(1 + α), we get   ˆ
CS = 0.5[a(1 + α) – p]
2/(1 + α). The seller’s profit is Π =  (p, α)  – c (p, α), where 
≡ p/(1 + α). 




We assume that in stage 1 the price agreed upon is the outcome of the following simple 
alternating-offers bargaining game.
6 There are two rounds of bargaining. In the first 
round, the buyer makes an offer. If the seller accepts the offer, the game is over. If she 
rejects the offer, then she makes a counter offer in round two. If the buyer rejects the 
                                                           
4Most papers on price bargaining assume that the buyer wants a unit or some fixed amount of the 
commodity. Hence the quantity purchased by the buyer is not endogenous. Since quantity bonus is used to 
manipulate the quantity demanded, we need to make quantity endogenous.  
5 Given that we have already specified a demand function, the solution in stage 2 is trivial. If we had begun 
with a utility function, then the buyer’s demand function will be derived in stage 2. This will involve 
choosing q to maximize his surplus. 
6While our bargaining model is very simple, it is important to note that our result does not necessarily 
depend on the form of the bargaining game.  
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offer, the game is over. If the buyer accepts the offer, the game is over. If the parties fail 
to agree on a price in round 2, the seller gets a payoff of S > 0 and the buyer gets a payoff 
of B > 0. Let δb, δs ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factors of the buyer and seller. One may argue 
that it is inconsistent to have a discount factor between bargaining rounds but not 
between the four stages of the game. As in bargaining models like Rubinstein (1982), the 
discount factor captures the cost of delay in bargaining. Hence, we could use something 
else other than the discount factor (like an exogenous probability of a breakdown in 
negotiations, a shrinking total surplus between rounds, etc) to capture the cost of delay 
(see Binmore, et. al (1986)). 
We assume complete information. In this stage, α is fixed. It is obvious that the 
buyer’s surplus is monotonically decreasing with the price, p. When the seller offers a 
price, p, she is actually offering a price,  = p/(1 + α). She chooses   to maximize   p ˆ p ˆ
Π = [p(a -  ) – c(a - p)] subject to the buyer’s participation constraint. Ignoring the 
buyer’s participation constraint (for a moment), the seller’s profit is maximized when she 
chooses p = p
ˆ p ˆ ˆ
M = 0.5(a + c)(1 + α) or   = 0.5(a + c).  p ˆ
We solve this bargaining game backwards, so we begin from round 2. Let the 
price offered by the seller in this round be p2. Suppose p2 is such that  
CS2 = 0.5[a(1 + α) – p2]
2/(1 + α) = B and p2 ≤ p
M. Then the seller will offer the price  
p2 = a(1 + α) -  B ) 1 ( 2 α + ≤ p
M. For the sake of analysis, we focus on this case. The 
corresponding profit for the seller is Π2 = [p2/(1 + α)] (p q ˆ 2, α)  – c (p q ˆ 2, α)  =  
(a – c) ) 1 /( B 2 ) 1 /( B 2 α + − α + which we assume is, at least, equal to S. Hence when the 
game gets to this round the buyer will accept the seller’s offer. Now consider round 1. In 
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this round, if the buyer’s offer, p1, is such that CS1 = δbCS2 =  δbB < B, then p1 > p2. So 
p1 > p
M, if p2 = p
M.  In this case, both the buyer and the seller prefer a lower price. So this 
cannot be an equilibrium offer. Hence we restrict the analysis to p2 < p
M, such that p2 <  
p1 ≤ p
M, if CS1 = δbCS2 =  δbB. If the buyer’s offer is such that CS1 > δbB, we assume that 
these restrictions on the prices hold. Under these assumptions, the buyer will offer a 
price, p1, such that [p1/(1 + α)] (p q ˆ
q ˆ
1, α)  – c (p q ˆ 1, α)  = δsΠ2. Let this price be p1 ≡ p* = 
p*(α). We assume that the buyer’s associated surplus CS1≡ CS* ≥ δbCS2 = δbB. As in 
alternating-offers bargaining models with complete information, there is a sub-game 







   Taking the derivative of   
[p*(α)/(1 + α)]q (p*(α), α)  – c (p*(α), α)  = δ ˆ sΠ2 ≡ Π* with respect to α gives 
.
p / q ˆ ][ c p [ ) 1 /( ) ( q ˆ
] ) /( * p [ q ˆ ] q ˆ ][ c * p [ / * * p
2
∂ ∂ + α + ⋅





  This derivative is positive, if 
∂Π*/∂α > 0. To see this, note that the seller’s profit (i.e., the LHS of equation (1)) is 
increasing for  ∈ [0, 0.5(a + c)). Hence p ≡ p*/(1 + α) must be increasing in this range, 
if the seller’s profit is increasing. If α is increasing, then p* must increase for p*/(1 + α) 
to increase. Therefore, given p1 = p* < p
M, it follows that ∂p*/∂α > 0. The buyer is 
willing to accept a higher price, if he knows that he will be compensated with a quantity 
bonus and the seller will only offer a quantity bonus if that will cause the buyer to accept 
a higher price and her profit will increase. As noted earlier, the sellers in these markets 
usually persuade buyers (during price bargaining) to accept a higher price in return for a 
quantity bonus. 
 




Stage 0   
We now determine the seller’s choice of α. The optimal α is given by 
α* = argmax δsΠ2. 
Note, however, that for our purposes, we do not need to find the optimal α (i.e., α*). All 
that we require is that some quantity bonus (i.e., α > 0) is preferred to a zero quantity 
bonus (i.e., α = 0). In other words, it is sufficient to show that ∂Π*/∂α > 0 at α = 0, 
where δsΠ2 ≡ Π*. Given Π2 = (a – c) ) 1 /( B 2 ) 1 /( B 2 α + − α + , ∂Π*/∂α > 0 at α = 0, if  
2B – 0.5(a – c) B 2 > 0. We assume that this condition holds.  
In this model, if the seller’s profit is increasing in α, the buyer’s surplus must be 
decreasing in α. However, there is an upper bound on α, given that the buyer’s surplus, 
CS*, cannot fall below δbB. This means that at α = 0, we require CS* > δbB. It is easy to 
satisfy this requirement by making δb and/or B sufficiently small. As α increases, the 
seller’s surplus increases and the buyer’s surplus falls till the optimal α is such that CS* 
= δbB if p*/(1 + α*) ≤ 0.5(a + c). If CS* = δbB and p*/(1 + α) > 0.5(a + c), then α is 
reduced such that p*/(1 + α*) = 0.5(a + c) and CS* > δbB.  
If the seller cannot post price, p, but can post α, then she can post p≡ p/(1 + α), if 
p is a function of α. However, this does not necessarily mean that the seller can replicate 
the equilibrium that would have obtained if she could directly post the price. To see this, 
note that depending on the nature of bargaining, the relationship between p and α may 
differ. Suppose p
ˆ
nb is the optimal price if the seller could post prices. Then quantity bonus 
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allows the seller to replicate this equilibrium if there exists an α which solves the 
equation p
nb = p(α)/(1 + α) or p(α) – (1 + α)p
nb = 0 , where p(α) is the function which 
links the bargained price with α. However, there may not be a feasible solution to this 
equation. In this case, quantity bonus cannot replicate the equilibrium which would have 
obtained if the seller could directly post the price.  
 
2.1 Discussion 
               It is important to emphasize that quantity bonus benefits the seller but hurts the 
buyer. The price which maximizes total surplus is p = c. The seller only benefits if 
quantity bonus increases the average price. That is, the (average) price  
p*/(1 + α*) > p**, where p** is the bargained price if the seller does not offer a quantity 
bonus and p* is the price with quantity bonus. Since quantity bonus must increase the 
(average) price for the seller to benefit, it means that total surplus decreases. Hence this 
only makes sense if the seller gets a bigger share of the smaller surplus such that she is 
better off than she was with a bigger total surplus (when no quantity bonus is offered). 
Note that quantity bonus causes the buyer to bargain less “aggressively”. This is because 
he is willing to accept a higher price because he knows he will be a given a quantity 
bonus. If this decrease in the buyer’s bargaining “behavior” is sufficiently high then 
quantity bonus is good for the seller. Hence quantity bonus could exist in equilibrium 
although it benefits the seller but reduces the buyer’s surplus.  
                 If quantity bonus reduces the surplus of the buyer, why doesn’t the buyer reject 
it when it is offered. The reality is that a buyer cannot credibly refuse a quantity bonus, 
given that is an ex-post offer. If he could refuse it, he will bargain more “aggressively”. 
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But he knows that he cannot credibly commit to rejecting the quantity bonus ex-post 
when bargaining is over and the bonus is offered. Since both the buyer and seller know 
this, their bargaining behavior is accordingly affected. Note that we have assumed that 
the seller can commit to a quantity bonus. A reason why the seller will commit to 
announced quantity bonuses is because reneging on her promise has a social sanction. If 
this social sanction is sufficiently high, then the buyer knows that the seller will not 
renege on her promise.  
  Our argument is somewhat related to Dow (1993).  In a model in which capital 
bargains with labor, he argues that capitalists may choose inefficient forms of 
organization if it enhances the bargaining power of capital by so much that capital gets a 
sufficiently bigger share of the smaller total surplus compared to their share of a bigger 
total surplus if they had chosen a more efficient form of organization. It follows that labor 
is worse off. In our case, offering quantity bonus increases price and makes total surplus 
smaller. But the seller’s share of this smaller surplus is sufficiently bigger such that she 
finds it optimal to offer a quantity bonus. Offering a quantity bonus will not benefit the 
seller if the buyer can also offer the seller a deal which neutralizes the adverse effect of 
quantity bonus on the buyer’s welfare. However, it may still be a Nash equilibrium for 
both parties to offer bargaining deals. We elaborate on this point in the final section. 
 
3. Quantity bonus versus price 
We have shown that quantity bonus in developing economies may be beneficial to 
the seller. But why doesn’t the seller ignore quantity bonus and instead reduce the price? 
That is, a price equal to p*/(1 + α*) could replicate any equilibrium with quantity bonus. 
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It is important to note that we have argued that sellers in these markets are forced to 
bargain over the price with buyers because they cannot credibly commit to a price. To 
argue that price can replicate quantity bonus is to claim that the sellers can post prices. In 
a world of complete information, the only price they can credibly post is a price equal to 
marginal cost. If they “post” any price above marginal cost the buyers have the incentive 
to bargain anyway. In these markets, any initial asking price (above marginal cost) by a 
seller is seen as an invitation to bargain rather than a final price until both parties have 
agreed on a price via bargaining. The buyers will still bargain even if the initial asking 
price by a seller gives a higher surplus than the surplus they expect to get from other 
sellers. After all, the buyers are trying to maximize the difference between the surplus 
from the seller (they are currently dealing with) and their option value. Indeed, in some 
cases when a buyer asks a seller for a price, the seller will not quote a price but will 
instead ask the buyer to quote a price. This is because the seller knows that any price she 
quotes in response to the buyer’s question “what is your price”, will be followed by a 
lower quoted price by the buyer resulting in bargaining. Indeed, the seller expects the  
buyer to bargain and will be surprised if he didn’t.
7 These buyers cannot commit that they 




                                                           
7 For example, the following quote which we found at 
http://www.alexanderpalace.org/petersburg1900/10.html illustrates our point: “Bargaining in Russia was 
standard practice and it drove American visitors mad. It happened everywhere - even when a shop or hotel 
posted a sign claiming "Prix Fixe", fixed prices. No one who knew the system would be foolish enough to 
pay the listed price in hotels.” 
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accepted as the final offer by buyers anyway, it does not make sense to use price alone.
8 
Our argument is that even if the seller announced a zero quantity bonus (i.e., α = 0) and 
quoted a price that gave the buyer the same surplus as in the Nash equilibrium above, the 
buyer will bargain over the price if it is above marginal cost. This will make the seller 
worse off since she will have to offer a bigger surplus than the surplus in the Nash 
equilibrium above. As McAfee and Vincent (1997, p 247) write: “[a]lthough in many 
environments, bargainers would like to impose take-it-or-leave-it offers, they often 
cannot credibly commit never to attempt to renegotiate in the event that no sale occurs”. 
  The argument above is again related to Dow (1993). In his model, if labor can 
commit to forgo bargaining over the wage, the surplus-maximizing wage will be chosen 
by both parties and the surplus will be divided through side payments. Dow (1993) 
excludes this scenario by assuming that if capital bribes labor to accept such deals, labor 
can simply pocket the bribe and restart negotiation without penalty. In other words, just 
as the buyer, in our model, cannot commit to not bargain over the price, the workers in 
Dow’s model cannot commit to not bargain over the wage. 
In contrast the buyers do not bargain over the quantity bonus in these markets. 
They usually see it as favor or gift from the seller since they do not directly pay for the 
quantity bonus. To bargain over favors or gifts is considered to be socially unacceptable; 
it suggests that the intended recipient is ungrateful. The reader might argue that since the 
buyers know that they indirectly pay for the quantity bonus, why should they think that it 
                                                           
8 We recognize though that our bargaining framework does not explicitly model the process of bargaining. 
In an explicit alternating-offers bargaining model, like ours, with complete information no bargaining 
actually takes place since in a sub-game perfect equilibrium one party announces a price in the first period 
and the other party accepts immediately. Our complete information model is only an approximation of what 
happens in the real world. But it should be clear to the reader that our main results in propositions 1 and 1a 
do not depend on the assumption of complete information. This assumption is made for tractability. 
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is a gift? Consider then the following alternative argument. The buyers can always 
threaten to walk away if they do not like the price offered by the seller. The seller may 
then be forced to reduce the price. In contrast, they cannot force the seller to increase the 
quantity bonus by threatening to walk away because the transaction has already been 
completed by then and so – in a one-shot interaction - the seller will not care if the buyer 
walked away. This argument may still hold in a repeated setting if the game is repeated. 
For example, if the game is repeated for a finite number of times, it is obvious that even if 
the buyers want to build a reputation of refusing quantity bonuses in earlier periods, it 
does not make sense to refuse the bonus in the last period. Then backward induction 
reasoning shows that they will not refuse it in earlier periods. This argument implies that 
the buyers cannot bargain over the quantity bonus even if they wanted to. Of course, we 
have not examined the possibility of a buyer offering a seller a bargaining deal. 
In general, we do not necessarily need the condition that buyers do not bargain 
over quantity bonuses. Our result will still go through if buyers bargain over quantity 
bonus but they bargain over it to a lesser extent than they do over prices. That is, price 
and quantity bonus must have different characteristics with respect to the ease with which 
they can be posted. However, from a modeling standpoint, it is easier if the buyers do not 
bargain over the quantity bonus. 
The argument above is probably weakened if the buyers decide to bargain over 
the quantity bonus before they bargain over the price. Note, however, that the quantity 
bonus is contingent on a successful transaction. The sellers will be reluctant to bargain 
over the quantity bonus when there is a possibility that the parties may not agree on a 
price. Bargaining over the quantity bonus before price bargaining will be perceived by 
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sellers and indeed by buyers as a waste of time, when there is no guarantee that a price 
will be agreed upon thereafter. It is like putting the cart before the horse. But if even if 
the buyer decides to bargain over the quantity bonus this might not alter our result. 
Bargaining over the quantity bonus implies that the seller cannot unilaterally choose α in 
stage 0. But if the seller prefers a positive α and the buyer prefers a zero α, then our 
result still goes through so long as the seller can commit to a positive quantity bonus and 
the buyer cannot commit to reject a quantity bonus, when it is offered. 
Since the sellers can post quantity bonuses but cannot post prices, they rely on 
quantity bonus as an additional tool when using price alone is less profitable. We wish to 
re-iterate that arguing that price can replicate quantity bonus is tantamount to claiming 
that a seller can post prices. Once we accept price bargaining as the process by which 
price is determined in these markets, then there is room for quantity bonus. Having 
agreed on a price via bargaining, it does not make sense for the seller to reduce the price 
because that nullifies the whole idea of bargaining over the price in the first place.
9 
Quantity bonus could be seen as an additional tool that these sellers use to maximize their  
profits in a world where prices cannot be posted.
10 Indeed, as indicated in section 1, Riley 
and Zeckhauser (1983) showed that price posting is more profitable than bargaining if the 
seller can post prices. They argue that the primary cost of allowing buyers to bargain is 
                                                           
9 If the seller can reduce the price after an agreed-upon bargained price, then this has to be included in the 
bargaining game, since the buyer must anticipate this. This complicates the bargaining game and calls into 
question why the seller bargains in the first place. 
10 This does not necessarily mean that quantity bonus will not exist in markets with posted prices. However, 
if they do it must be the case that, for some reason, further price competition is not profitable or is 
ineffective in attracting customers. Indeed, sellers or firms engage in various forms of non-price 
competition, when competing in prices is not profitable. Consider a market in which buyers consider a 
good to be low quality when the price is below a certain threshold.  To attract buyers, the sellers may not 
engage in price competition below this threshold price. Instead they may engage in some form of non-price 
competition like offering warranties to signal the quality of their good. 
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that “…it encourages buyers to refuse a high price in the hope of getting a lower one. (p. 
270)” To eradicate this cost, they show that sellers should post prices if they can. Our 
argument is that if sellers cannot post prices they will allow price bargaining but will also 
use non-price tools (like quantity bonus) that they can post to reduce (not necessarily 
eliminate) the cost identified by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). These tools are, however, 
contingent on a successful transaction (which would necessarily involve a price). The 
seller has the incentive to commit to a quantity bonus because it increases her profit in a 
market where she cannot post prices.
  
We summarize the discussion in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If sellers cannot post prices but can post quantity bonuses, then it is an 
equilibrium for sellers and buyers to bargain over prices and for sellers to post quantity 
bonuses. 
 
We now state a more general proposition: 
 
 Proposition  1a:  In markets where sellers cannot post prices they will allow price 
bargaining but will use non-price tools (like quantity bonuses) to maximize profits, if they 
can post these non-price tools. 
 
These propositions are very general. They do not hinge on the number of sellers, 
the nature of bargaining, how often the buyer and seller interact, etc. While these 
modifications might slightly alter the results, the crucial thing to note is that these 
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propositions hinge on the following conditions: (a) the inability of sellers to post prices, 
(b) the ability of sellers to post and commit to quantity bonuses or other non-price tools, 
(c) giving quantity bonus increases the sellers’ profit, and (d) the inability of buyers to 
reject quantity bonuses, when they are offered ex post. 
Note, however, that we have ruled out the possibility of the buyer offering a 
counter bargaining deal. While this is may be limitation of our analysis, it is consistent 
with what happens in LDC agricultural markets although we have assumed instead of 
explain why the buyer does not offer a counter bargaining deal. However, allowing the 
buyer to offer a counter bargaining deal will not substantially change our result. If this 
counter bargaining deal neutralizes the seller’s bargaining deal, then our result that the 
seller’s bargaining deal increases her profit will not hold. But if the buyer’s deal 
neutralizes the seller’s deal, it must be the case that the buyer gave the seller something 
of value equal to the seller’s quantity bonus (after the transaction was complete). In 
effect, the buyer returned the seller’s quantity bonus. This means that the buyer rejected 
the seller’s quantity bonus. But we have assumed that the buyer cannot reject the seller’s 
offer.  
The analysis also sheds some light on non-price competition. If sellers cannot post 
prices, they might try to compete by offering non-price bargaining deals. Note that our 
result will still go through if there are two sellers, so long as one seller has a lower 
marginal cost of production than the other seller. Introducing a second seller only 
changes the buyer’s option value. The seller with a higher marginal cost will post a price 
equal to marginal cost; this will be the highest surplus that she can offer. Indeed, this will 
be the price that she will post in a Bertrand equilibrium. The seller with a lower marginal 
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cost can offer a quantity bonus in conjunction with a bargained price which gives a 
higher surplus and gives her (i.e., seller) a positive profit; this might even replicate a 
Bertrand equilibrium if the quantity bonus is chosen accordingly.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We have argued that it is optimal for sellers use quantity bonus or bargaining 
deals in markets where prices cannot be posted. One may argue that offering quantity 
bonus is a social norm. We have shown that sellers have an incentive to offer quantity 
bonuses even if it appears they are being coerced by this social norm. Our analysis shows 
it may actually be beneficial for the seller to offer a quantity bonus. Quantity bonus is 
offered because the sellers can post them (i.e., make take-it-or-leave-it offers). The reason 
they can commit to these offers is that they do not care if the buyers threaten to walk 
away if the bonus is not increased, since the transaction has been completed by that time 
anyway. In contrast, since the transaction is contingent on price, the sellers usually care if 
a buyer threatens to walk away if the price is not lowered.  
It is important to note that while quantity bonus indirectly allows the seller to post 
the price, it may not fully replicate the equilibrium which might have obtained if the 
seller could directly post the price. As argued above, this depends on the nature of 
bargaining or the bargaining model used which in turn determines the relationship 
between the bargained price and the quantity bonus (e.g., the p(α) function in our model). 
It is also possible that it may not be optimal to offer a quantity bonus. This will be the 
case if ∂Π*/∂α < 0 for all α. This holds if 2B – 0.5(a – c)(1 + α) B 2 < 0 for all α. A 
sufficient condition for this to hold is 2B – 0.5(a – c) B 2 < 0. 
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The analysis also has general implications for bargaining situations. It suggests 
that during bargaining, the parties will try to extract surpluses from each other or improve 
upon their bargaining outcomes by offering bargaining deals (i.e., variables that they can 
post after bargaining is successfully completed). We have offered here a theory of 
bargaining deals. 
Posted prices are more likely to be public information while bargained prices tend 
to be private information. Since posted prices are public information, sellers can easily 
undercut each other’s price because each seller’s price is easily observable. The same 
argument does not necessarily hold when there is price bargaining or when prices cannot 
be posted. An interesting research agenda will be to examine how sellers compete when 
they cannot post prices and bargained prices are private information. 
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